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Abstract
A consequence of melting Arctic ice caps is the commercial viability of the
Northern Sea Route, connecting North-East Asia with North-Western Europe.
This will represent a sizeable reduction in shipping distances and a decrease in
the average transportation days by around one-third compared to the currently
used Southern Sea Route. We examine the economic impact of the opening
of the Northern Sea Route in a multi-sector Eaton and Kortum model with
intermediate linkages. This includes a remarkable shift of bilateral trade flows
between Asia and Europe, diversion of trade within Europe, heavy shipping
traffic in the Arctic, and a substantial drop in traffic through Suez. These
global trade changes are reflected in real income and welfare effects for the
countries involved. The estimated redirection of trade has also major geopolit-
ical implications: the reorganisation of global supply chains within Europe and
between Europe and Asia, and the highlighted political interest and environ-
mental pressure on the Arctic.
Keywords: Northern Sea Route, trade forecasting, gravity model, CGE models,
trade and emissions
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1 Introduction
Arctic ice caps have been melting as a result of global warming (Kay et al., 2011; Day
et al., 2012). The steady reduction of the Arctic sea ice has been well documented
(Rodrigues, 2008; Kinnard et al., 2011; Comiso, 2012), and there is broad agreement
on continued ice reductions through this century (Wang and Overland, 2009, 2012;
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Vavrus et al., 2012).1 Recent satellite observations, furthermore, suggest that the
climate model simulations may be underestimating the melting rate (Kattsov et al.,
2010; Rampal et al., 2011). This implies that in the recent future the extension of
the Arctic ice caps will be greatly reduced and even completely ice-free during the
summer. Besides the environmental effects, another consequence of this climatic
phenomenon is the possibility of opening up the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for
high volume commercial traffic. This shipping route will connect North East Asia
(i.e. Japan, South Korea and China) with Northwestern Europe through the Arctic
Ocean (see Figure 1). In practical terms, this represents a reduction in the average
shipping distances and days of transportation by around one third with respect to
the currently used Southern Sea Route (SSR). These reductions translate not only
into fuel savings and overall transport costs, but also to significant transport time
savings that may effectively force supply chains in industries between East Asia and
Europe to change.
Figure 1: The NSR and SSR shipping routes
1The ice caps in Greenland and Antarctica have also been melting at an ever-quicker pace since
1992 (Shepherd et al., 2012; Kerr, 2012).
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The NSR is already open during summer and a number of ships have already
used the route.2 Until 2011, there was still controversy about the feasibility of the
commercial use of the NSR. However, the ever-quicker melting pace found in several
studies (Shepherd et al., 2012; Kerr, 2012; Stroeve et al., 2012; Slezak, 2013) has
broadened the consensus in favour of its likely commercial use in the near future. A
growing number of papers find that this shipping route could be fully operational
for several months or all-year round at different points in the future (cf. Verny
and Grigentin, 2009; Liu and Kronbak, 2010; Khon et al., 2010; Stephenson et al.,
2013; Rogers et al., 2015).3 As a consequence, there has been heightened economic
interest on the NSR: Asia’s largest exporters –Japan, South Korea and China– are
already investing in ice-capable vessels, while Russia has plans to further develop
this shipping lane (Astill, 2012). Accordingly, the NSR will also have concrete
geopolitical implications, with an expected decline in the shipping transit through
the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal as well as an increased political interest in
the Arctic. China in particular has already shown political interest in the Arctic
by signing a free-trade agreement with Iceland in April 2013 and most recently
–together with Japan and South Korea– it gained observer status on the Arctic
Council.
Given the current uncertainties regarding the relation between the icecap melting
pace and the transport logistic barriers associated with the NSR, it is hard to predict
the year when the NSR will become fully operational. Throughout our study we use
a what-if approach where we assume that by the year 2030 the icecaps have melted
far enough and logistics issues related to navigating the Arctic have been resolved,
so the NSR is fully operationally all year round.4 In practical terms, this also implies
that we use an "upper bound" scenario that assumes that the NSR becomes a perfect
substitute for the SSR, and as such, all commercial shipping between North East
Asia and Northern Europe will use the shorter and cheaper NSR instead of the SSR.
Furthermore, since the opening of the NSR will be a gradual process that will take
a number of years, the economic adjustment pattern we describe in our analysis will
also be gradual.
Our economic analysis follows a three-step process. In the first step we re-
calculate physical distances between countries to account for water-transportation
shipping routes. In the second step we map out a multi-sector general equilibrium
model with intermediate linkages and trade modelled as in Eaton and Kortum (2002)
and derive a gravity equation to structurally estimate the trade elasticities and to
map the new distance calculations –for both the SSR and the NSR– into estimations
2These include recent shipping milestones: the fastest crossing Barents Observer (2011b) and
the first supertanker to use the NSR Barents Observer (2011a).
3The differences on the approximate year and the yearly extent for which the NSR will be
fully operational varies much between papers, depending on different assumptions and estimations
regarding the pace of the ice caps melting and developments in the shipping industry with respect
to the new route.
4The use of 2030 as our benchmark year is mainly for illustration purposes and the use of another
year does not affect our main economic results. For instance, we ran simulations using 2020 and
2050 as our benchmark year, and our main results remain robust to these changes.
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of the bilateral trade cost reductions between trading partners at the industry level.
In the third step we simulate the effect of the commercial opening of the NSR on
bilateral trade flows, macroeconomic outcomes, labour effects and changes in CO2
emissions employing our theoretical model.
With our model setup and calibration we are in the middle between the older
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models (cf. Dixon and Jorgenson, 2013), and
the recent quantitative trade models (see Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2013, for an
overview). The interaction of both analytical frameworks generates important syner-
gies. For instance, following the new quantitative trade models we improve the CGE
estimations in two fundamental ways. First, we model trade linkages with the im-
proved micro-founded Eaton and Kortum (2002) structure. Second, we structurally
estimate the trade parameters employing a gravity model derived from the theoret-
ical model using the same trade data that is used in numerical simulations. On the
other hand, we retain important elements of CGE modelling that are not present in
the new quantitative trade models. First, we work with a detailed and consistent
dataset for multi-sectors and countries with trade costs that explicitly include export
taxes, international transport costs and import tariffs varying by country-pairs and
sectors. Such a detailed break-down of overall trade costs is not present in recent
quantitative trade models.5 Second, we use a richer general equilibrium framework
that includes non-homothetic preferences, accounts for government expenditures,
overall savings and investment, multiple factors of production with varying degrees
of mobility, and linkages to emissions data. Thus, our model is a large multi-sector
implementation of an Eaton-Kortum model embedded in a CGE framework, where
we use econometric estimations of the Eaton-Kortum derived gravity equation to
parameterise the key trade and demand equations in the CGE model.
The NSR reduces shipping distances and time between Northwestern Europe
and Northeast Asia by about one third. These overall trade cost reductions can
further be separated between actual shipping cost reductions (i.e. fuel savings and
other transport costs) and distance-related iceberg trade costs (e.g. transport time
savings that can effectively create new supply chains in certain industries). We find
average transport cost reductions of between 20% and 30% between both regions
using intensively the NSR, while iceberg trade cost reductions are estimated to be
around 3% of the value of goods sold.
Using our model, we find that the direct consequence of opening-up the NSR
is that international shipping (volume by distance) is reduced by 0.43%, but global
trade volumes increase by 0.21%. Although global trade volume changes are not rad-
ically high, they are completely concentrated in trade increases that average around
10% between Northeast Asia (i.e. China, Japan and South Korea) and Northwestern
Europe. We estimate that the share of World trade that is re-routed through the
5Caliendo and Parro (2015) employ a quantitative Eaton-Kortum trade model to evaluate the
effect of NAFTA, arguing against the use of CGE-models claiming that they are too much a black
box. By clearly mapping out the structure of our model, we do not consider our model specification
to be a black box. Furthermore, the detailed break-down of trade costs is essential for our analysis
of the NSR.
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NSR will be of 5.5%. For instance, 15% of Chinese trade will use the NSR in the
future. This will result in a massive shift of shipping tonnage from the currently
used SSR to the NSR. Roughly 8% of World trade is currently transported through
the Suez Canal, and we estimate that this share would drop by around two-thirds
with a re-routing of trade over the shorter Arctic route. Since on average around
15,000 commercial ships crossed the Suez Canal yearly between 2008 and 2012, the
re-routing of ships through the NSR will represent about 10,000 ships crossing the
Arctic yearly.6 This implies incentives for large-scale construction of physical infras-
tructure in sensitive Arctic ecosystems, heightened economic security interests linked
to Arctic trade, and tremendous pressure on the facilities and economies servicing
the older SSR (including Egypt and Singapore).
This huge increase in bilateral trade between these two relatively large eco-
nomic zones also results in a significant diversion of trade. The bilateral trade
flows between Northeast Asia and Northwestern Europe significantly increase at the
expense of less trade with other regions. In particular, there is a sizeable reduc-
tion in intra-European trade, with less trade between Northwestern Europe with
South and Eastern Europe. Bilateral exports from Northwestern Europe (Germany,
France, The Netherlands and the UK) to/from Northeastern Asia (China, Japan
and South Korea) increase significantly, while South European exports remain un-
changed. The Eastern countries of the EU experience a combination of dramatic
increases in exports to Asia (e.g. Poland and Czech Republic) with no significant
changes in exports for Hungary and Romania.
The changing opportunities for trade translate into macroeconomic impacts as
well: real incomes and GDP are estimated to increase modestly in the countries
that benefit directly from the NSR. Northeast Asia and Northwestern Europe ex-
periences the biggest gains. On the other hand, most South and Eastern European
countries experience real income decreases. Hence, the disruption in intra-EU trade
and regional production value chains caused by the opening of the NSR, is negatively
affecting the South and Eastern EU member states. For the affected countries, these
impacts –in the range of less than half a percentage point of GDP– are comparable
to estimated effects from an EU-US free trade agreement, or the Doha and Uruguay
Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations.7 Moreover, there are small labour mar-
ket effects at the aggregate and sectoral level, so there is relatively little labour
displacement effects, which will not represent an important shock.
Finally, we also estimate the impact of the NSR on changes in CO2 emissions.
We find that although the much shorter shipping distances will reduce the emissions
associated with water transport, these gains are all but offset by a combination of
higher volumes traded between Northeast Asia and Northwestern Europe, and a
shift in emission-intensive production to East Asia.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we analyse the logistic issues and
projections for commercially using the NSR in the future. We then explain how we
6Transit data are available from the Suez Canal Authority (http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg).
7See for exampleFrancois (2000), Francois et al. (2005), and Francois et al. (2013).
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estimate the new water-transportation distances in Section 3. In the next section
we map out the theoretical structure to evaluate the impact of the NSR. In section
5 we discuss calibration of the model, derive a gravity equation and estimate the
gravity equation to calculate the effect of the new distance measures on trade costs.
The simulations and macroeconomic results are presented in Section 6. Section 7
concludes by summarising our main results.
2 Commercial feasibility of the Northern Sea Route
There are two elements that condition the NSR becoming a fully viable commercial
substitute of the SSR. The first is the ice levels in the Arctic, which is the main
barrier to the commercial use of the NSR. As mentioned before, there is ample
scientific evidence of the melting of the Arctic ice cap (Rodrigues, 2008; Kinnard
et al., 2011; Comiso, 2012), that it will continue melting in the future (Wang and
Overland, 2009, 2012; Vavrus et al., 2012), and other studies even suggest that the
melting process may accelerate in the future as well (Kattsov et al., 2010; Rampal
et al., 2011). Stammerjohn et al. (2012) note that already some Arctic regions are ice
free now more than predicted by climate models for 2030, while in a meta-analysis
of model results Rogers et al. (2015) identify a median prediction of 2034 for an
ice free Arctic in September. These elements will make the commercial use of the
NSR more likely in the near future. Figure 2 further illustrates the current degree
of ice cap melting (until 2007) and the forecasts produced by the GFDL model of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). From this figure
one can observe that by 2030 the ice cap will have melted enough to make the NSR
ice-free, although it is not clear if this will be the prevalent condition year-round by
then. These predictions have been also supported by more recent research (Wang
and Overland, 2012).
The second barrier to the NSR is the transport logistic issues associated with
the opening of a new commercial shipping route in a region with extreme weather
conditions. Even though a number of ships have already used the NSR during
summer months, significant logistical obstacles remain. These include slower speeds,
Russian fees and customs clearance, limited commercial weather forecasts, patchy
search and rescue capabilities, scarcity of relief ports along the route and the need
to use icebreakers and/or ice-capable vessels (Liu and Kronbak, 2010; Schøyen and
Bråthen, 2011). These conditions not only affect the insurance premia currently
charged to use the NSR, but also they limit the commercial viability of shipping
operations, which are dependent on predictability, punctuality and economies of
scale (Humpert and Raspotnik, 2012). However, with a yearly increasing number
of ships using the NSR and the political and economic interest of Russia and other
stakeholders to develop the NSR, it is expected that these logistic limitations will
be gradually overcome in the near future.8
8For instance, Russia created a Federal State Institution in March 2013 to administrate the
NSR: The Northern Sea Route Administration (www.nsra.ru), which provides logistical assistance
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Figure 2: Arctic Sea Ice Extent observation (1970 to 2007) and forecast (2030 to
2100)
Source: NOAA GFDL model reproduced in Humpert and Raspotnik (2012) by The Arctic
Institute.
The uncertainties of both the pace and extent of ice cap melting and the logistical
conditions associated with a fully commercial use of the NSR are translated into
a wide range of estimates regarding the precise date when the NSR will be fully
operational. The uncertainties regarding both elements, are also directly related
and reinforce each other. In particular, a quicker pace of melting will also make it
easier to overcome the transport logistical obstacles. Therefore, the assessments of
the feasibility of the NSR range from studies that see limited use of the NSR for
many years to come (cf. Lasserre and Pelletier, 2011, and papers referred therein)
throughout the route. In addition, Russia has also already started setting up 10 relief ports along
the route.
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and more optimistic papers that foresee the commercial use of the NSR within 10
years (Verny and Grigentin, 2009).
In our study, we take a middle-point approach and use 2030 as our benchmark
year, for which we assume that the NSR will be fully operational all-year round.
However, our economic estimations are not dependent on this occurring precisely in
2030. We needed to choose a benchmark year mainly for reporting reasons, since
we expect to have quantitatively similar results if we used another benchmark year,
either an earlier one (2020) or later one (2050).9
The main fact needed for our estimations to be relevant, however, is that the
NSR must become (at some point in time) fully commercially viable during the
whole year, so it is in practical terms, a fully viable (and perfect) substitute to the
SSR. This implies that we use an "upper bound" scenario that will estimate the
largest expected trade and economic impact from the NSR.10
It is important to note that the melting of the Arctic icecaps will be a global
climate phenomenon with widespread ecological and economic impacts. From the
economic point of view, the opening of the NSR will be one of the main impacts,
but not the only one. Additional economic impacts may include the possibility to
exploit natural resources in the Arctic Ocean and the Arctic region (i.e. Siberia
and Northern Scandinavia), and the potential opening of the North Western Route
connecting Northeast Asia with the East Coast of Canada and the United States.
3 Estimating shipping distance reductions using the North-
ern Sea Route
As the first step of our analysis, we estimate the precise distance reductions for bilat-
eral trade flows associated with the NSR. To do so we first need to include shipping
routes in the estimation of the distance between two trading partners. Currently,
the econometric literature on the gravity model of bilateral trade relies on measures
of physical distances between national capitals as a measure of distance, known as
the CEPII database (Mayer and Zignago, 2011).11 However, these measures use the
9As a robustness analysis, we use these two different years as our benchmarks: 2020 and 2050.
Our results show that the use of different benchmark years affects the size of some of the results,
but the main qualitative results and patterns describe for 2030 remain robust to the use of different
years. The results fro 2020 and 2050 are available upon request.
10For instance, if the NSR is not operational during winter and/or other logistic issues related
to the extreme weather of the Arctic are not fully resolved, then it can be expected that shipping
companies pursue a diversification strategy, using both routes conditional on which offers the lowest
costs at certain seasons the year. Another potential limitation of the NSR fully substituting the
SSR is the increased pressure on current transportation infrastructure. In particular, current hubs
–i.e. the Port of Rotterdam– may need to expand. However, since the opening of the NSR will be
a gradual process, we expect that any additional infrastructure needs can be developed while the
NSR becomes fully operational.
11In particular, CEPII’s GeoDist database (www.cepii.fr) estimates geodesic distances, which
are calculated using the geographic coordinates of the capital cities. A simple measure is the
distance between countries’ capitals on the surface of a sphere (i.e. the great-circle formula). A
8
shortest physical distance and thus, are not appropriate for the present exercise.
Shipping routes are usually longer than the shortest physical distance, and melt-
ing sea ice will not change the physical distance between Tokyo and London, for
example.
3.1 Current shipping distances
Rather we need a more precise measure of actual shipping distances. To this end,
we first build a new measure of distance between trading countries. Given the
importance of ocean transport for global trade we wanted to take water distances
between trading partners into account. Globally, 90% of world trade in volume and
80% in value –and the overwhelming majority of trade between non-neighbouring
countries– is carried by ship (OECD, 2011, 2013).12 For the country pairs and trade
flows we focus on here, water transportation, or multi-modal transport (water and
land) accounts for a majority of trade.
Therefore, to obtain more accurate measures of trade distance, we work with
shipping industry data on the physical distance of shipping routes between ports in
combination with land-transport distances. We continue to use CEPII’s bilateral
distances to represent land routes (and so the land component of combined land-
water routes), while the water routes were provided by AtoBviaC.13 As water routes
we define the shortest water distances between two major ports. For each country
we choose one major port. As a country’s major port we define the largest and/or
most significant port in terms of tons of cargo per year from ocean-going ships –
except for Australia, Canada, Spain, France, Great Britain, India, Russia, United
States, and South Africa, where due to the large size of these countries and their
multiple accesses to water we picked two or, in the case of the US, three major ports.
In the case of two trading partners with access to water, distance is calculated as
the shortest land and water distance between these countries’ major ports. For
example we estimate the trade distance between China and The Netherlands as the
shipping distance from Shanghai to Rotterdam using either the SSR or the NSR.
For landlocked countries 14 we assume that a port in a neighbouring country is used,
more recent and sophisticated approach is to measure distance between two countries using the
population weighted average index created by (Head and Mayer, 2010; de Sousa et al., 2012). This
last measure also incorporates the internal distances of a country.
12The rest moves primarily by land. Few exceptions use air transportation, which mainly applies
for high-value commodities that need to reach the final destination in a short time (e.g. fish and
flowers).
13This is a commercial company that offers sea distances to the maritime industry
(www.atobviaconline.com/public/default.aspx). In particular, they provided us with port-to-port
water distances.
14These are countries that do not have direct access to an ocean or an ocean-accessible water
way, and thus must rely upon neighbouring countries for access to seaports. Landlocked countries
in our dataset are Afghanistan, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Czech Republic, Ethiopia,
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kosovo, Laos, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Republic
of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, San Marino,
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so distance between a landlocked country and a trading partner with access to water
is obtained by combining the landlocked country’s land distance (from CEPII) to
a neighbouring country with a major port and water distances from that port to
different trading partners (from AtoBviaC). For example distance between Austria
and Nepal (both landlocked) is obtained as a combination of land distance from
Austria to Germany, water distance from Germany to India, and land distance from
India to Nepal.
Finally, we also take into account shipping distance asymmetries. Due to sea
currents, commercial shipping lanes, anti-piracy routes and country specific seafaring
regulations, shipping distances from country A to country B are not the same as the
distance from B to A. Hence there are asymmetries in shipping distances, which can
represent up to two percentage-points differences in the distance reductions using
the SSR.
3.2 New shipping distances using the NSR
For the new distances related to the opening up of the NSR, we use the estimates
by Liu and Kronbak (2010).15 Since only some countries will experiment shorter
shipping distances with the opening of the NSR, we estimate the new shorter dis-
tances to Europe for a selected number of Asian and Oceanian countries.16 Thus, we
also estimated the new distances between all European countries and the selected
countries above.
In Table 1 we show the great-circle formula distances, current shipping distances
(using the SSR), the new NSR distances and the percentage reductions between
Northeast Asia’s biggest exporters (China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) and
the four Northern European countries with the busiest container ports: Netherlands
(Rotterdam), Belgium (Antwerpen), Germany (Hamburg and Bremerhaven) and
Great Britain (Felixstowe). The commercial use of the NSR implies a significant
shipping distance reduction. For instance, the effective distance is reduced by around
37% from Japan to North European countries, while the same figure is around 31%
for South Korea, 23% for China and 17% for Taiwan.
Serbia, Slovakia, Swaziland, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vatican
City, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
15They estimate that the distance reduction between Yokohama and Rotterdam using the NSR
will be of 8075km. We then adjust for the distance Yokohama-Nagoya (251km) to get the Nagoya-
Rotterdam reduction (7824km), which is comparable to the AtoBviaC SSR distance Nagoya-
Rotterdam. For European countries south of Rotterdam we use the AtoBviaC distances between
those ports to Rotterdam and then the Rotterdam-Nagoya NSR distance and then the distance
from Nagoya to other Asian countries. For European countries north of Rotterdam we use the
BLM Shipping 2.0 software to obtain the distance from Tromsø (Norway) to Rotterdam, and then
estimate the distance Tromsø-Nagoya using the NSR. Then we use shipping distances from North
European ports to Tromsø to obtain their NSR distances to Japan and the other Asian countries.
16These are: Japan, North and South Korea, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Viet Nam,
Cambodia, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, Australia and New
Zealand.
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Table 1: Different distance values for selected countries
From: To: Great-circle
formula (km)
SSR (km) NSR (km) NSR against
SSR % change
China Netherlands 7,831 19,942 15,436 -23%
China Belgium 7,971 19,914 15,477 -22%
China Germany 7,363 20,478 15,942 -22%
China United Kingdom 8,151 19,799 14,898 -25%
Japan Netherlands 9,303 20,996 13,172 -37%
Japan Belgium 9,464 20,976 13,345 -36%
Japan Germany 8,928 21,536 13,083 -39%
Japan United Kingdom 9,574 20,779 13,182 -37%
South Korea Netherlands 8,573 20,479 14,200 -31%
South Korea Belgium 8,722 20,458 14,373 -30%
South Korea Germany 8,140 21,019 14,110 -33%
South Korea United Kingdom 8,875 20,262 14,210 -30%
Taiwan Netherlands 9,457 18,822 15,601 -17%
Taiwan Belgium 9,587 18,801 15,774 -16%
Taiwan Germany 8,959 19,362 15,511 -20%
Taiwan United Kingdom 9,790 18,605 15,611 -16%
Sources: Great-circle distances taken from the GeoDist database from CEPII. SSR and NSR
distances are own estimations based on data from AtoBviaC, BLM Shipping, and Liu and Kronbak
(2010).
It is important to note that the NSR only makes the shipping distance shorter
for countries in northern East Asia, but not for countries closer or below to the
equator. For instance, the shipping distances from the Philippines and Papua New
Guinea to Northern Europe are slightly shorter using the NSR (by around 1500km),
but countries that are located South and East from these countries have shorter
shipping distances using the SSR (e.g. Viet Nam, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia,
Malaysia, India).
4 Model
Since the opening of the NSR is a global phenomenon that affects several countries at
once, it will create inter-related shocks between different trading economies. Trade
facilitation through the NSR will not only affect bilateral trade, but also sectoral
production and consumption patterns, relative domestic and international prices and
the way production factors are used in different countries. Therefore, we employ a
general equilibrium model with multiple countries, multiple sectors with interme-
diate linkages, and multiple factors of production. Trade is modelled as in Eaton
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and Kortum (2002) with the remaining structure of the model largely following the
standard GTAP CGE model (Hertel, 2013).
4.1 General structure
Due to space constraints we assume that the reader is familiar with conventional
production functions like Cobb-Douglas, CES and Leontief. There are 𝐽 = 110
countries. In each country 𝑗 utility is a Cobb-Douglas function over three aggregate
goods, private goods 𝑞𝑝𝑗 , public goods 𝑞
𝑔
𝑗 , and savings 𝑞𝑠𝑗 . Preferences for private
goods in turn are described by the non-homothetic Constant Distance Elasticity
(CDE) function over 16 sectors 𝑠. With CDE preferences the model allows for
shifting average and marginal budget shares as a country grows. At the same time
the model stays tractable in a setting with a large number of countries and sectors,
since a limited number of parameters can be calibrated from income and own-price
elasticities of demand. CDE preferences can be described by the following implicit
expenditure function:
𝑆∑︁
𝑠=1
𝛼𝑗𝑠
(︁
𝑞𝑝𝑗
)︁𝛾𝑗𝑠𝜂𝑗𝑠 (︃𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑠
𝑥𝑝𝑗
)︃𝛾𝑗𝑠
= 1 (1)
where 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑠 is the price of private goods in country 𝑗 and sector 𝑠, 𝑥
𝑝
𝑗 are private
expenditures in country 𝑗 and 𝛼𝑗𝑠, 𝛾𝑗𝑠 and 𝜂𝑗𝑠 are parameters (called respectively
the distribution, substitution and expansion parameters). Demand 𝑞𝑝𝑗𝑠 follows from
log-differentiating equation (1) with respect to 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑠 and 𝑥
𝑝
𝑗 , and reorganising we
obtain:
𝑞𝑝𝑗𝑠 =
𝛼𝑗𝑠
(︁
𝑞𝑝𝑗
)︁𝛾𝑗𝑠𝜂𝑗𝑠 (︂𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑠
𝑥𝑝𝑗
)︂𝛾𝑗𝑠−1
𝛾𝑗𝑠
𝑆∑︀
𝑢=1
𝛼𝑗𝑢
(︁
𝑞𝑝𝑗
)︁𝛾𝑗𝑢𝜂𝑗𝑢 (︂𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑢
𝑥𝑝𝑗
)︂𝛾𝑗𝑢
𝛾𝑗𝑢
(2)
Preferences for spending by the public sector across the 16 sectors are CES.
Including savings in the static utility function implies that a shift away from future
consumption and savings towards current consumption would have large welfare
effects. The formal underpinning comes from Hanoch (1975) who showed that the
expressions for consumption in an inter-temporal setting can also be derived from
a static utility maximisation problem with savings in the utility function. Savings
are used to finance investments. Savings in all countries are collected by a "global
bank" channeling the savings to investment in different countries with an incentive
to invest more in countries with a higher rate of return. Rates of return are not
equalised in the model, though, to prevent large swings in investment demand.
4.2 International trade
Within each of the 16 sectors production takes place as in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
So there is a continuum of varieties each country can produce under perfect com-
petition with consumers having a CES utility function across the continuum. The
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cost of delivering a variety from source 𝑖 to destination 𝑗 in sector 𝑠 is given by:
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑠 =
𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑠
𝑧
(3)
where 𝑐𝑖𝑠 is the price of input bundles in country 𝑖 and sector 𝑠 and 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑠 is the
composite of trade costs expressed in power terms. The productivity 𝑧 is drawn
from a Frechet distribution with technology parameter 𝑧𝑖𝑠 and dispersion parameter
𝜃𝑠, as:
𝑃 (𝑧𝑖𝑠 ≤ 𝑧) = exp
(︃
−
(︂
𝑧
𝑧𝑖𝑠
)︂−𝜃𝑠)︃
(4)
Composite trade costs 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑠 consist of one plus the export tax 𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑠, one plus the
international transport margin 𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑠, one plus the import tariff 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑠, and iceberg
trade costs 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑠, which in turn consists of an observable component 𝜏 𝑖𝑗𝑠 driven by
gravity type variables and an unobservable component ̃︀𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑠, such that:
𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑠 = (1 + 𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑠) (1 + 𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑠) (1 + 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑠) 𝜏 𝑖𝑗𝑠̃︀𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑠 (5)
Because of the detailed GTAP-data we can include also export taxes and in-
ternational transport margins as components of trade costs. This is an important
improvement on previous Eaton-Kortum multi-sector applications and it allows us
to explicitly model international transport costs and how they are affected by the
NSR.
The international transport margin 𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑠 is equal to payments to the value of
international transport services 𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑠 divided by the FOB value of trade 𝑣𝑓𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑠 . The
demand for international transport services is proportional to the demand for export
goods. International transport services are supplied by all countries and aggregated
into global transport services by a Cobb-Douglas production function.17
𝑐𝑖𝑠 is the price of input bundles used for production in country 𝑖 and sector
𝑠, determined by the price of intermediates used from all sectors and the price of
factor input bundles. The choice between the aggregates of intermediates and factor
inputs is described by a Leontief production function. Also the choice between
intermediates from different sectors is Leontief. There are five different factor inputs:
land, unskilled and skilled labour, capital, and natural resources. The choice between
factor input bundles is CES. Land and natural resources are not perfectly mobile
between sectors, and are modelled by an elasticity of transformation function.
With our setup the quantity sold from 𝑖 to 𝑗 at the sectoral level, 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑠, is given
by:
𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑠 =
(︁
𝑐𝑖𝑠
𝑧𝑖𝑠
𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑠
)︁−𝜃𝑠
𝑞𝑗𝑠
𝐽∑︀
𝑘=1
(︁
𝑐𝑘𝑠
𝑧𝑘𝑠
𝑡𝑘𝑗𝑠
)︁−𝜃𝑠 (6)
17Due to a lack of data there is no link between the supplying country and the demanding
countries of these services.
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𝑞𝑗𝑠 is the total demand for goods in sector 𝑠 in country 𝑗, reflecting demand for
intermediates by firms, demand for capital goods, and demand for public and private
goods. A reduction in trade costs as a result of for example the NSR generates both
more trade along the intensive and the extensive margin in the model. With lower
trade costs there are more sales of each variety within a sector and more varieties
are sold.
Eaton and Kortum (2002) only express the value of sales. We work with quan-
tities, since our numerical model is expressed in quantities. Because the price dis-
tribution in country 𝑗 of goods bought from country 𝑖 is identical for all sources 𝑖
(property 𝑏 on page 1748 of Eaton and Kortum, 2002), the quantity share is identical
to the volume share in the Eaton and Kortum model.
5 Calibration of the model
5.1 Gravity estimation of trade parameters
The trade parameters required to implement the model numerically are the dis-
persion parameters 𝜃𝑠, the technology parameters 𝑧𝑖𝑠 and the trade costs 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑠. To
obtain the dispersion parameters we estimate a gravity equation following from the
theoretical structure with Eaton and Kortum production. The expression for the
value of trade 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 is identical to the expression for the quantity of trade in equation
(6), except for the fact that the total quantity demanded 𝑞𝑗𝑠 is replaced by the total
value demanded. Capturing ( 𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑧𝑖𝑠 )
−𝜃 by an exporter fixed effect 𝑑𝑖𝑠 and the value
demanded by an importer-fixed effect 𝑑𝑗𝑠 and dividing by one plus the import tariff
gives the following gravity equation for the value of trade 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 in CIF terms:18
ln 𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑠 = 𝑑𝑖𝑠 + 𝑑𝑗𝑠 − (𝜃𝑠 + 1) ln (1 + 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑠) (1 + 𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑠) + 𝛽𝑠 ln 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠 (7)
where 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑠 consists of observable variables explaining iceberg trade costs 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑠 (and the
export tax 𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑠). As observable variables we include the standard gravity variables:
distance, common colony, common language, common border (contiguous), former
colony and dummies for shallow, medium and deep free trade agreements (FTA).19
Preferential trade agreements are free trade agreements and customs unions that
have been agreed at least four years previously (Dür et al., 2014). Besides these
traditional gravity regressors, we include two political economy variables, PE index
1 and PE index 2, measuring the pairwise similarity of the two trading partners.
These variables reflect evidence that homophily is important in explaining direct
economic and political linkages (De Benedictis and Tajoli, 2011). The two political
18The value of trade in our theoretical model is inclusive of tariffs paid. So to get the value of
trade in CIF terms, thus excluding the import tariff, we divide by one plus the import tariff.
19Following Egger et al. (2011), we instrument preferential trade agreements. As explanatory
variables in the first stage regression we include the variables also present in the gravity equation
(except for tariffs) as well as lagged trade network embeddedness (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010; De
Benedictis and Tajoli, 2011; Zhou, 2011) and a variable for the economic mass of the two trading
partners together, measured as GDP of the source country times GDP of the destination country.
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economy variables are calculated as the two first principal components of the follow-
ing four variables: the difference in polity, the functioning of governance difference,
the corruption score difference, and the difference in civil society scores.
Following the theoretical gravity equation, tariffs and the international transport
margin have the same coefficient and are thus included as one combined variable,
ln(1+ 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑠)(1+ 𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑠), called Trade Cost in Table 2. As tariff variable ln(1+ 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑠)
we employ the log difference between the most favoured nation (MFN) tariff rate
and the preferential tariff rate (based on FTAs), with the MFN rate also captured
by the importer fixed effect. Data on the international transport margin are taken
from the GTAP database. Since data on transport margins are only available for
a limited number of countries, we use fitted values for the missing observations on
the transport margin from a regression of transport margins on the same set of
explanatory variables as those used in the gravity equation (excluding tariffs).
We estimate equation (7) using a sample of 110 countries in 2011. Trade data are
taken from the GTAP database to have consistency with the CGE simulations.20
Data for tariffs come from the World Bank/UNCTAD WITS database. Distance
data, as discussed above, are based on the length of shipping routes. Other socio-
economic data are from Dür et al. (2014), the CEPII database (Mayer and Zignago,
2011), and the Quality of Governance (QoG) expert survey dataset (Teorell et al.,
2011). Following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2011), we estimate equation (7)
with Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) for trade for each manufacturing
sector in the computational model.21
The results are shown in Table 2. The tariff elasticities give us one plus the
dispersion parameters 𝜃𝑠. The distance elasticities will be used to calculate the total
trade cost reductions as a result of the reduction in shipping distances. Since we
cannot estimate tariff elasticities for the services sector, we use the trade elasticities
employed in the GTAP model implying a value of 2.8 for the dispersion parameters.
To shed light on the importance of changes in shipping distance, we explore how
much the variation in distance contributes to the variation in trade flows. We do
this in two ways. First, we show that distance explains between 3% and 19% of the
variation in trade flows in the different sectors with all control variables (see the
last row of Table 2). Second, due to multicollinearity with variables like FTA, we
have also evaluated the change in the pseudo-R2 at the sectoral level when including
distance in a regression of trade values with only importer and exporter fixed effects
(see Table 7 in the Appendix). This exercise shows that including distance makes
a huge difference, raising the R2 by 18% to 53% in the different sectors. So the
change in shipping distance as a result of the NSR is an important factor to explain
variation in trade flows.
The conventional approach to obtain trade costs 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑠 and the technology parame-
ters 𝑧𝑖𝑠 in the Eaton and Kortum model starts with estimation of a gravity equation
as in equation (7). Trade costs are equal to the fitted trade values based on the
20Using COMTRADE data gives almost exactly the same coefficient estimates.
21The 16 sectors are composed of 11 manufacturing sectors and 5 services sectors.
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Table 2: PPML gravity estimates for manufacturing sectors
BT CRP ELE MTL MVH OGD OMC PRA PRE PRF P_C
trade costs -1.700 -5.546 -13.489 -7.945 -3.396 -5.485 -13.940 -3.724 -6.483 -3.360 -11.386
(3.29)*** (5.48)*** (4.93)*** (6.17)*** (2.96)*** (6.08)*** (7.45)*** (3.63)*** (10.25)*** (3.77)*** (4.10)***
𝑙𝑛(distance) -0.665 -0.422 -0.394 -0.491 -0.464 -0.585 -0.348 -0.712 -0.604 -0.609 -0.591
(31.02)*** (21.68)*** (16.42)*** (26.56)*** (18.78)*** (25.27)*** (18.53)*** (32.81)*** (35.10)*** (22.54)*** (14.19)***
PE index 1 -0.237 0.004 0.239 0.047 -0.035 0.169 0.109 0.139 0.032 0.169 0.018
(5.39)*** (0.16) (6.13)*** (1.97)** (0.78) (5.74)*** (3.25)*** (4.08)*** (1.21) (5.61)*** (0.60)
PE index 1 0.062 -0.190 -0.098 0.063 -0.073 -0.028 -0.139 0.060 -0.043 -0.092 0.103
(1.04) (5.68)*** (1.94)* (1.10) (1.49) (0.81) (3.78)*** (1.05) (1.26) (1.39) (1.64)
common colony 0.167 -0.038 0.679 0.160 -0.546 0.309 0.034 -0.234 -0.176 0.281 0.417
(0.85) (0.24) (2.11)** (0.58) (1.66)* (0.87) (0.16) (1.35) (0.71) (1.00) (1.85)*
common ethnic language 0.385 0.306 0.560 0.306 0.208 0.284 0.410 0.560 0.403 0.424 0.390
(3.29)*** (2.73)*** (3.70)*** (2.95)*** (1.52) (2.48)** (4.05)*** (5.16)*** (5.11)*** (2.19)** (2.58)***
contiguous 0.221 0.529 0.429 0.799 0.544 0.902 0.575 0.644 0.763 0.754 0.948
(1.86)* (6.49)*** (3.39)*** (10.44)*** (4.36)*** (9.84)*** (6.12)*** (4.50)*** (10.08)*** (3.37)*** (4.42)***
former colony 0.749 0.268 0.120 0.455 -0.364 0.275 0.293 0.130 0.122 0.917 0.178
(4.72)*** (1.73)* (0.70) (3.13)*** (1.81)* (2.34)** (2.33)** (1.06) (1.27) (3.82)*** (0.96)
shallow FTA (DESTA=1,2) -0.921 0.576 0.348 0.335 -0.217 0.241 0.946 -0.428 0.887 -0.618 0.921
(3.34)*** (3.61)*** (1.44) (2.61)*** (0.60) (1.02) (5.04)*** (1.92)* (3.82)*** (1.24) (2.57)**
medium FTA (DESTA=3,4,5) -0.193 0.070 -0.201 -0.140 0.594 -0.442 -0.415 0.088 -0.203 1.108 1.362
(0.94) (0.40) (0.67) (0.74) (2.55)** (3.03)*** (2.70)*** (0.49) (1.87)* (3.43)*** (4.14)***
deep FTA (DESTA=6,7) 1.493 1.163 1.266 0.811 2.083 1.028 1.504 2.383 1.252 1.569 4.088
(4.00)*** (5.54)*** (4.04)*** (3.82)*** (8.11)*** (3.52)*** (5.06)*** (8.91)*** (7.21)*** (4.20)*** (10.09)***
European Union 0.527 0.632 0.710 0.175 1.008 0.343 -0.035 1.017 0.449 0.622 -1.023
(2.93)*** (5.09)*** (3.75)*** (1.41) (7.02)*** (3.05)*** (0.30) (6.74)*** (3.91)*** (1.97)** (1.60)
𝑁 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 9,955
pseudo 𝑅2 0.9874 0.9766 0.9619 0.9789 0.9763 0.9849 0.9760 0.9854 0.9879 0.9369 0.8530
V: distance share of variance 0.1886 0.0401 0.0435 0.0617 0.0583 0.0757 0.0270 0.1443 0.0948 0.1095 0.0404
Notes: PPML estimates, all including source and destination fixed effects (not shown). PE index
1 and PE index 2 are composite variables of similarity in political economy indicators as discussed
in text. The variables shallow FTA, medium FTA and deep FTA have been instrumented for.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. Sector
codes: B_T beverages & tobacco; CRP chemicals, rubber, plastics; ELE electrical machinery;
MTL metals; MVH motor vehicles; OGD other goods; OMC other machinery; PRA primary
agriculture; PRE primary energy; PRF processed foods; P_C petrochemicals. The statistic V, for
predicted log-linear trade values, is 𝑏22𝑉 𝐴𝑅(𝑙𝑛(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒))/𝑉 𝐴𝑅𝑙𝑛(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒).
observable variables and importer (exporter) specific trade costs. The technology
parameters are obtained by writing the technology parameters 𝑧𝑖𝑠 as a function of
the exporter (with importer specific trade costs) or importer fixed effects (with ex-
porter specific trade costs) and the price of input bundles 𝑐𝑖𝑠(Eaton and Kortum,
2002; Shikher, 2012; Levchenko and Zhang, 2015). With data on 𝑐𝑖𝑠, the 𝑧𝑖𝑠 can
then easily be obtained.
We follow a different route, inspired by recent work by Egger and Nigai (2014)
and Egger and Nigai (2015) and the CGE literature. Egger and Nigai (2014) argue
that exporter and importer fixed effects are picking up part of the unobservable trade
costs and only importer or exporter specific unobserved trade costs is not enough
to account for that. Neglecting the unobservable trade costs results in a relatively
large difference between actual and predicted trade values. In calibrating an Eaton
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and Kortum economy, Egger and Nigai (2015) propose to calculate trade costs and
technology parameters from actual import shares, imposing that there is a perfect
fit between actual and predicted normalised trade shares and that income is equal
to exports to all destination countries.22 We follow this approach and thus solve 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑠
and 𝑇𝑖𝑠 from the following set of equations:
𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑠
𝜔𝑗𝑗𝑠
=
(︁
𝑐𝑖𝑠
𝑧𝑖𝑠
𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑠
)︁−𝜃𝑠
(︁
𝑐𝑗𝑠
𝑧𝑗𝑠
𝑡𝑗𝑗𝑠
)︁−𝜃𝑠 (8)
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑠 =
𝐽∑︁
𝑗=1
(︁
𝑐𝑖𝑠
𝑧𝑖𝑠
𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑠
)︁−𝜃𝑠
𝐽∑︀
𝑘=1
(︁
𝑐𝑘𝑠
𝑧𝑘𝑠
𝑡𝑘𝑗𝑠
)︁−𝜃𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑗𝑠 (9)
where 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑠 is the market share of imports from country 𝑖 in total demand in country
𝑗 and 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑠 and 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑗𝑠 are respectively the value of production in country 𝑖 and
demand in country 𝑗. In comparison with a calibration based on observable trade
costs only, the perfect fit is achieved, because total trade costs consist of a mix of
observable and unobservable trade costs. Since our numerical model is written in
relative changes the exact value of trade costs 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑠 and technology 𝑇𝑖𝑠 following from
equations (8)-(9) is irrelevant for model simulations. It is only required that the
predicted import shares are equal to the actual market shares in the baseline.
5.2 Trade cost reductions
The reduction in distance as a result of the NSR has an impact on two types of trade
costs, international transport services and iceberg trade costs. The percentage re-
duction in international transport services costs, Δ ln 𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑠, (the "atall" in the GTAP
code) is calculated as the reduction in distance times the elasticity of international
transport services costs with respect to distance, 𝜂𝑖𝑡𝑠,𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡:
Δ ln 𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑠 = −𝜂𝑖𝑡𝑠,𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡
(︃
NSRdistance𝑖𝑗
distance𝑖𝑗
− 1
)︃
(10)
To calculate 𝜂𝑖𝑡𝑠,𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 international transport services are regressed on distance, while
controlling for port infrastructure and including industry fixed effects. This equation
is estimated restricting the sample to European and East Asian countries for three
reasons. First, the quality of the transport service data is poor for many other
countries (in particular the African countries). Second, the NSR is about a reduction
in shipping distances between Europe and East Asia. And third, the empirical
literature on the determinants of shipping costs shows that the effect of is non-
linear (OECD, 2008). Table 3 shows that the estimated elasticity 𝜂𝑖𝑡𝑠,𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 is equal to
0.789.23
22This approach is similar to the approach in the CGE literature with the Armington shifters set
such that there is a perfect fit between actual an fitted trade flows.
23A series of papers find that the elasticity of shipping costs to distance is around 0.2 (Radelet
and Sachs, 1998; Fink et al., 2000; Limão and Venables, 2001; Micco and Pérez, 2002; Clark et al.,
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Table 3: Regression of shipping costs and shipping distances for Europe-Asia trade
ports -0.047
(4.12)***
𝑙n(distance) 0.789
(5.56)***
_cons -4.216
(3.02)***
𝑅2 0.64
𝑁 2,448
Notes: PQML estimates of shipping rate (in percent). Includes industry dummies. Ports is a
WEF/World Bank index of port quality.
In Table 4 we present a summary of the transport cost reductions. These are
sector-specific and vary by trading country pairs. Moreover, the transport cost
changes are not symmetric –i.e. the trade costs from China to Germany are different
than from Germany to China.
A fall in distance does not only affect international transport service costs but
also other barriers to bilateral trade such as information costs, business networks,
cultural barriers, time, coordination, and other non-shipping service costs (cf. Hum-
mels and Schaur, 2013). In our framework, these additional trade barriers are cap-
tured by the iceberg costs, so the NSR will also reduce iceberg trade costs. The
percentage reduction in iceberg trade costs Δ ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑠 (the "ams" in the GTAP code)
is calculated as the reduction in distance as a result of the NSR times the elasticity
of trade costs with respect to distance. The elasticity of trade costs with respect to
distance is calculated from the distance and tariff elasticities in Table 2. This gives
the following expression for Δ ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑠:
Δ ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑠 =
𝛽𝑠,distance
𝜃𝑠 + 1
(︃
NSRdistance𝑖𝑗
distance𝑖𝑗
− 1
)︃
(11)
Since international transport services are also included as a regressor in the gravity
equation, the effect of distance on trade costs and thus on trade flows through inter-
national transport services is accounted for separately. Therefore, we can attribute
the entire effect of distance from the gravity equation to a reduction in iceberg
trade costs. Our estimates of Δ ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑠 are summarised in Table 5 below. Note that
these iceberg trade costs are also country-pair and sector-specific and are also not
symmetric.
2004). However, OECD (2008) use the most comprehensive shipping costs dataset to date and
find that the effect is non-linear, presents large variations between goods, and is asymmetric in
costs between the same routes. Therefore, our relatively high elasticity can be reconciled with the
existing literature, because distance seems to matter more for shipping costs between East Asia and
Europe.
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Table 4: International transport cost reductions for 11 non-services sectors for se-
lected countries.
cost reductions cost reductions
From: To: average max min From: To: average max min
DEU CHN 21.73 22.15 17.48 CHN DEU 20.49 20.89 16.48
DEU JPN 33.07 33.71 26.60 CHN FRA 4.69 4.78 3.77
DEU KOR 26.62 27.14 21.42 CHN GBR 21.19 21.61 17.05
CHN NLD 20.96 21.37 16.86
FRA CHN 6.37 6.50 5.13
FRA JPN 21.00 21.41 16.89 JPN DEU 32.95 33.59 26.50
FRA KOR 12.77 13.02 10.27 JPN FRA 20.96 21.37 16.86
JPN GBR 34.00 34.67 27.35
GBR CHN 22.41 22.84 18.02 JPN NLD 33.65 34.31 27.07
GBR JPN 34.13 34.80 27.45
GBR KOR 27.47 28.01 22.10 KOR DEU 25.40 25.90 20.43
KOR FRA 11.13 11.35 8.95
NLD CHN 22.16 22.59 17.83 KOR GBR 26.28 26.79 21.14
NLD JPN 33.77 34.43 27.17 KOR NLD 26.00 26.51 20.91
NLD KOR 27.18 27.71 21.86
Notes: Average is the mean iceberg cost reductions between all 11 manufacturing sectors, while
max and min are the maximum and minimum cost reductions, respectively. Codes: DEU
(Germany), FRA (France), GBR (United Kingdom), NLD (Netherlands), CHN (China), JPN
(Japan) and KOR (South Korea). Source: Own estimations.
5.3 Additional parameters
The three remaining sets of parameters come from the GTAP model.24 First, the
largest set of parameters are those related to the CDE utility function. To start,
the substitution parameters 𝛾𝑗𝑠 are calculated from the own-price elasticities of
substitution. The expansion parameters 𝜂𝑗𝑠 can then be calculated from income
elasticities and the 𝛾𝑗𝑠. The own-price elasticities are based on spending shares and
income elasticities with the income elasticities varying by region and taken from
different sources.25 Second, the substitution elasticities between factor inputs in each
of the sectors are based on a review of the empirical literature in the SALTER project
(Zeitsch et al., 1991). The values range between 0.25 for agricultural goods and 1.68
for the transport sector. Third, the parameter governing investment reallocation
between countries is set at 10, implying that investments are reallocated across
countries at a modest rate.
24The main characteristics and references to the standard GTAP model can be found at:
www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/models/current.asp. See also Hertel (2013) and Rutherford and Palt-
sev (2000) for a more detailed discussion.
25See Huff et al. (1997) for further discussion of the sources of the income elasticities and the
calibration procedure .
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Table 5: Iceberg trade cost reductions for 11 non-services sectors for selected coun-
tries.
iceberg cost reductions iceberg cost reductions
From: To: average max min From: To: average max min
DEU CHN 2.85 4.46 0.62 CHN DEU 2.68 4.19 0.58
DEU JPN 4.48 7.03 1.01 CHN FRA 0.59 0.92 0.12
DEU KOR 3.54 5.55 0.78 CHN GBR 2.77 4.35 0.60
CHN NLD 2.74 4.30 0.60
FRA CHN 0.80 1.26 0.17
FRA JPN 2.75 4.31 0.60 JPN DEU 4.46 7.00 1.01
FRA KOR 1.64 2.56 0.35 JPN FRA 2.74 4.30 0.60
JPN GBR 4.62 7.25 1.05
GBR CHN 2.94 4.61 0.64 JPN NLD 4.57 7.16 1.03
GBR JPN 4.64 7.28 1.05
GBR KOR 3.66 5.74 0.81 KOR DEU 3.36 5.27 0.74
KOR FRA 1.42 2.22 0.30
NLD CHN 2.91 4.56 0.63 KOR GBR 3.49 5.47 0.77
NLD JPN 4.59 7.19 1.04 KOR NLD 3.45 5.41 0.76
NLD KOR 3.62 5.67 0.80
Notes: Average is the mean iceberg cost reductions between all 11 manufacturing sectors, while
max and min are the maximum and minimum cost reductions, respectively. Codes: DEU
(Germany), FRA (France), GBR (United Kingdom), NLD (Netherlands), CHN (China), JPN
(Japan) and KOR (South Korea). Source: Own estimations.
5.4 Data
To assess the global general equilibrium effects of the commercial use of the Northern
Sea Route, we work with the GTAP9 database with base-year 2011, projected along
the medium or SSP2 (Shared Socioeconomic Pathway) from the most recent SSPs
and related Integrated Assessment scenarios (IIASA, 2012; O’Neill et al., 2012).26
In the paper, we focus on the year 2030 from this baseline. Our model allows us to
analyse both the trade and macroeconomic implications associated with the NSR,
as well as changes in CO2 emissions from production and international transport.27
We aggregate the 57 GTAP sectors into 16 sectors, and the 129 regions into 110
countries (see Table 8 and Table 9 in the Appendix).28
26These are standard macroeconomic projections used in the related literature. These projections
provide the baseline scenario against which our simulations are compared. Hence, the use of a
particular baseline scenario will not change qualitatively our main results.
27GTAP is the standard basic data used in most CGE models. See Narayanan et al. (2012) for
documentation on the GTAP database, and Hertel (2013) on the full database project.
28The model is implemented in GEMPACK under OSX and the model code is available upon
request, as well as an executable version of the model.
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6 Counterfactual analysis of reductions in trade costs
through the NSR
To assess the global general equilibrium effects of the commercial use of the Northern
Sea Route, working from the 2030 projections, our main simulation results are the
differences between the baseline values in 2030 (i.e. the business-as-usual scenario
with no NSR shipping) compared with the counterfactual scenario where we allow
bilateral trade to move through the NSR. In this counterfactual scenario, we include
both the transport and trade cost reductions as discussed above into our CGE model
to assess the impact on bilateral trade flows, sectoral output, and other macroeco-
nomic variables.29 We also look into the social costs of these trade changes in terms
of overall welfare, and employment/wage changes. We also analyse the changes that
shorter shipping routes have on transport related pollution levels, which account for
both shorter distances but also on potentially larger trade volumes.
6.1 Trade effects
Once we run the counterfactual simulation, we obtain global and bilateral trade
changes. These changes in trade represent the difference by 2030 –when we assume
that the NSR will be fully operational– between the current use of the SSR and the
NSR. First, we find that using the NSR will reduce international shipping (volume
by distance) by 0.44%, but global trade volumes increase by 0.21%. Although these
global trade volume changes are not radically high, they are completely concentrated
in trade changes between Northeast Asia (i.e. China, Japan and South Korea) and
Northern Europe. For instance, we estimate that the share of World trade that is
re-routed through the NSR will be of 5.5%. Of the total Chinese trade in 2030, we
project that 14.9% will use the NSR.
Table 6 shows the bilateral trade changes in trade values for goods and services
for the main four Northeast Asian exporters. We can observe the significant changes
in export and import values of the three main Asia countries that benefit from the
NSR: China, Japan, and South Korea.
First, we observe how Northwestern countries significantly increase their exports
to China, Japan and South Korea. This group is compromised of Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. Trade with France, Spain and Portugal is also increasing but less
than in the previous group. On the other hand, trade with Northeast Asia is barely
changing or even decreasing for the Mediterranean European countries (i.e. Italy
and Greece). An interesting case is Eastern Europe, where some countries closer
to the North increase their exports to Northeastern Asia (e.g. Czech Republic,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia), while others have no significant
export increases (Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia). In Table 10
29As explained in Section 5, this is done through a mix of both technical efficiency in shipping
and iceberg trade costs, where in total these are equivalent to estimated reductions in total trade
costs.
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Table 6: Northeast Asia, changes in total trade values for selected countries, per-
centage changes
China Japan South Korea
exports imports exports imports exports imports
Austria 12.64 10.36 10.97 17.10 8.95 11.78
Belgium 12.34 11.28 15.82 10.82 14.69 11.86
Bulgaria -1.71 0.69 -0.81 0.41 -1.25 0.16
Croatia -1.29 0.57 -1.18 -0.01 -0.80 0.20
Czech Republic 8.17 15.44 15.15 18.60 10.49 18.51
Denmark 11.43 9.39 2.64 11.31 5.76 9.19
Estonia 10.75 12.03 9.31 14.55 11.73 6.19
Finland 10.98 6.91 11.77 16.03 10.44 12.49
France 1.51 3.41 9.17 7.81 4.18 6.46
Germany 10.53 10.37 13.88 11.54 7.07 12.58
Greece -0.99 0.49 -0.45 0.27 -0.72 0.16
Hungary -2.08 0.50 -1.44 1.09 -1.38 0.89
Ireland 6.56 6.99 3.64 11.78 18.68 8.90
Italy -1.42 0.97 -1.06 0.17 -0.87 0.30
Latvia 11.37 14.31 5.59 10.34 11.26 11.67
Lithuania 11.03 10.07 9.18 11.36 12.91 7.00
Netherlands 10.62 9.40 14.96 12.98 13.18 12.79
Poland 11.02 13.51 13.64 16.71 9.87 14.71
Portugal -0.60 0.89 3.16 3.70 3.76 1.36
Romania -1.79 0.77 -1.25 0.26 -1.25 0.25
Slovakia 7.68 6.06 14.37 9.15 9.66 14.64
Slovenia -1.59 1.18 -1.05 0.50 -0.82 0.86
Spain -0.64 0.99 5.50 4.61 1.97 2.12
Sweden 12.70 10.53 13.37 17.97 9.95 12.02
United Kingdom 12.33 8.23 12.30 7.77 7.95 8.98
EU28 6.72 7.48 10.23 9.01 6.49 8.62
Norway 12.63 12.93 12.91 13.20 5.19 10.43
Turkey -1.31 0.40 -1.03 0.32 -0.81 0.14
United States -0.72 0.46 -0.58 0.14 -0.30 0.06
Source: Own estimations using the GTAP database.
in the Appendix we show the corresponding data for merchandise trade in volumes,
which shows a similar pattern to the one described above.
This remarkable increase in bilateral trade between two relatively large economic
zones is translated into a significant diversion of trade –i.e. the bilateral trade flows
between Northeast Asia and Northwestern Europe significantly increase at the ex-
pense of less trade with other regions. The main diversion effect is that there is
a sizeable reduction in intra-European trade, with less trade between Northwest-
ern Europe with South and Eastern Europe. Figure 3 shows these trade diversion
patterns.
The precise figures for the countries in Figure 3 and additional countries is pre-
sented in Tables11 in the Appendix, were we can clearly observe this trade diver-
sion pattern. First, German trade increases by around 11% to Northeast Asia (i.e.
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Figure 3: Trade flows after opening the NSR: percentage changes in exports by
selected countries
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Japan, South Korea and China), while trade with other European countries slightly
decreasing (by around half percentage point), with Eastern European countries ex-
periencing the biggest decrease of one percentage points. This pattern of changes
in German exports is also replicated by the other Northwestern European countries
(e.g. Austria, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United King-
dom). This is also the case for some Eastern European countries that are closer to
the Baltic sea (i.e. Poland and the Czech Republic). France, Spain and Portugal
also increase their trade with Northeast Asia but at a much lower level rate be-
tween 3% and 1%, which does not compensate for the reduction of intra-European
trade and thus, overall trade barely changes for these countries. On the other hand,
the other Mediterranean countries (Italy, Greece) and Eastern European countries
(Hungary, Romania) experience a decrease in trade with both Asia and Europe that
is reflected in an overall reduction of trade. Finally, the Northeast Asian countries
show that exports increase significantly to Northwestern Europe while experiencing
a slight decrease for the rest of the World (RoW).
This pattern of trade diversion can also be seen when we look at exports at the
sectoral level. For instance, Tables 12 and 13 in the Appendix show the sectoral
changes in exports to China and Germany. We observe that sectoral exports are
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evenly spread among all manufacturing sectors with few exceptions (mainly the
service sectors). Looking at the trade flows to Europe, in Table 13 we show the
percentage changes in export sales to Germany –which has a very similar pattern
from exports to other Northwestern European countries. Here we find that China,
Japan and South Korea significantly increase their exports to Germany in almost
all sectors but services, while all other European countries decrease their exports to
Germany.
Overall, even when trade diversion is significant, aggregate exports do not change
significantly. In Figure 4 we show the changes in aggregate export volumes by
country. We observe that Northwestern European countries increase there export
volumes, since the increase of exports to Asia compensates for less intra-European
trade. However, Southern and Eastern European countries have a decrease in ex-
ports due to the reduction of exports to other Europe countries, which is not fully
compensated by exports to third regions.
Figure 4: Changes in export values for selected countries, percentage changes
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Source: Own estimations using the GTAP database.
6.2 Macroeconomic outcomes
The changes in trade flows are translated into macroeconomic impacts as well. First,
GDP and welfare (measured as per capita utility percentage changes) are estimated
to increase modestly in the countries that benefit directly from the NSR (see Fig-
ure 5).30 Northeast Asia, Northwestern Europe (and also Poland and the Czech
Republic) experience the biggest gains. On the contrary, most South and Eastern
30See also Table 14 in the Appendix for the GDP and real income changes for all countries. There
we also present two measure of welfare changes: per capita utility and equivalent variation in US$
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European countries experience GDP decreases. This last effect is caused by the
disruption in intra-EU trade and regional production value chains caused by the
opening of the NSR. The associated trade diversion pattern is therefore negatively
affecting the South and Eastern EU members states. To put these effects in per-
spective, these GDP impacts –in the range of less than half a percentage point of
GDP– are comparable to estimated effects from an EU-US free trade agreement, or
the Doha and Uruguay Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations.31
Figure 5: GDP and welfare changes associated with the opening of the NSR for
selected countries, percentage changes
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database.
We can observe from Figure 6 that there is a direct relationship between these
real income changes and the country-specific changes in exports (and overall trade
volumes). In general, countries that increase their exports are those that also benefit
from the opening of the NSR. The linkage between trade and welfare gains, therefore,
is provided by the use (or not) of the new trade possibilities associated with the NSR.
In particular, the positive welfare and GDP effects are driven by the reduction in
the transportation and iceberg costs associated with the commercial use of the NSR.
The countries that benefit from these trade costs reductions are those that will use
intensively the NSR, and by extension, are the same countries that will also increase
their trade volumes. On the other hand, countries that do not use the NSR will
million. Both measures of welfare experience changes that follow roughly the same pattern as GDP
and real income changes; while the last welfare measure shows changes in US$ that are directly
related to country size.
31See for example Francois (2000), Francois et al. (2005), and Francois et al. (2013)).
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not benefit from the trade costs reductions and will, in addition, experience trade
diversion (increased competition from other countries), which is associated with
lower trade, but also with lower welfare and GDP. However, given the relatively
small aggregate trade changes, sectoral output follows a similar pattern. We find that
much of the sectoral output in most EU countries does not change significantly.32
Figure 6: Total export values and real income, percentage changes
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6.3 Labour market effects
To analyse changes in the labour market we use two different CGE model closures. In
the first –which is our benchmark model used to estimate the information presented
so far– we assume a flexible labour supply, sticky wages and the labour market is
cleared by changes in overall employment levels.33 In the second closure, we assume
the labour supply is fixed and the labour market is cleared solely by changes in wages.
In general, the changes in wages and employment are closely linked to changes in
GDP, which in turn are related to the possibility to benefit from the use of the NSR
as explained above.
In Table 15 in the Appendix, we present the changes in real wages and employ-
ment for both model closures. First, we observe that changes in real wages have a
similar pattern to changes in real income. Countries that have declines in real wages
are also expected to experience declines in real incomes. The sign and magnitude
of the changes are similar between both model closures. Moreover, this pattern ap-
plies to both unskilled and skilled workers, which reflects that there are only minor
changes in the relative demand of each skill level.34
32The specific sectoral results are available upon request.
33We use a wage curve with an elasticity of 0.2.
34This is also expected given the relatively small changes in sectoral output. The demand for
skills varies by economic sectors, but if the output shares of these sectors do not change significantly,
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From Table 15 we also observe that aggregate employment changes by country
are negligible. For the flexible labour supply closure, changes are usually below a
tenth of a percentage point –i.e. the changes in real wages are not enough to affect
overall labour supply. On the other hand, in the fixed labour supply closure overall
employment does not change by construction, since wages adjust to maintain full
employment.
However, when we look at the sectoral level, the changes in employment are more
relevant. For instance, to summarise the sectoral changes in employment we con-
struct a labour displacement indicator, which is calculated as the weighted standard
deviation of the changes in sectoral employment. This is a standardised measure of
the percentage change in employment by country. Although it varies much between
countries, in Table 16 in the Appendix, we observe that on average around 0.5% or
less of the total labour force is displaced to another sector. Furthermore, in Table
16 we also present the sectoral changes for low skill workers in three selected sectors.
Here we observe that the sectoral displacement is also relatively modest (i.e. less
than one percentage points).
Therefore, we do not expect andy medium nor large scale labour adjustment
shocks, since the changes in sectoral output and employment will be very modest
and will occur gradually according to the speed at which the NSR substitutes for
the SSR.
6.4 Changes in CO2 emissions
Regarding CO2 emissions, we use the supplementary emissions data from the GTAP
database.35 CO2 emissions are directly linked in the model to sectoral production
and consumption. There are different emission level by sector and increasing (de-
creasing) the production/consumption of a particular good will increase (decrease)
the emissions from that sector. Overall emissions are then defined by the con-
solidated changes in both sectoral production and consumption. For instance, if
more polluting sectors increase production relative to less polluting sectors, then
emissions will decrease. This approach assumes that the overall technological links
between production, consumption and emissions remain constant, as well as the
sector-specific links.36
At first it is expected that the shorter shipping distances associated with the NSR
will reduce fuel costs and emissions from the water transport sector. However, the
then this is reflected in small changes in relative demand for skills and the skill premium –i.e. the
difference between skilled and unskilled wages.
35The GTAP database regularly incorporates CO2 emissions data from the International En-
ergy Agency (IEA), following UN IPCC guidelines, allocated based on GTAP energy volume
data. This involves the Tier 1 method of IPCC Guidelines. See McDougall and Golub (2007)
and Lee (2008) for further discussion. The integration of global input-output data with green-
house gas is an ongoing initiative, supported in part by the EPA and including the MIT Joint
Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change. Further information is available here:
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/models/energy/default.asp.
36Projecting future paths of emission technological changes by country and sector pairs is beyond
the scope of this paper, so we retain this approximation.
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increase in trade volumes also means that when the shipping distance is reduced, the
shipping services are increased due to the jump in trade volumes between Northern
Europe and Northeastern Asia. Therefore, both effects almost offset each other, but
we estimate that there is nonetheless a slight increase in global emissions of 14.2
million MT CO2 (see Table 17 in the Appendix). This increase is comparable to the
annual emissions for a small countries (e.g. Latvia and Lithuania).37
Note that in these simulations we assume that the implicit emission levels by
sector and country remain constant. This also means that changes in emission levels
are not counteracted by policy efforts (i.e. carbon taxes, emission permits) nor by
technological changes that can affect the effective emission levels by country and
sector.
7 Summary
The commercial use of the Northern Sea Route –if ultimately made possible by
further melting of the Arctic icecap– will represent a major development for the
international shipping industry. The NSR represents a reduction of about one third
of the average shipping distance and days of transportation with respect to the
currently used Southern Sea Route. Roughly 8% of World trade is transported
through the Suez Canal and we estimate that two-thirds of this volume will be
re-routed over the shorter Arctic route.
These shorter shipping distances are associated with substantial reductions in the
transportation and trade costs between two major economic regions: Northeast Asia
and Northwestern Europe. We estimate that these overall trade costs reductions will
increase the trade flows between both regions in average by around 10%, depending
on the specific countries involved. This will transform the NSR into one of the busiest
global trading routes, which in turn implies heightened economic and geopolitical
interests linked to the Arctic and tremendous economic pressure on the countries
currently servicing the older SSR (e.g. Egypt and Singapore). In addition, the NSR
will also imply a large volume of trade diversion, that will have a negative economic
impact on South and East Europe. We also find that there will be –for specific
countries and sectors– some significant labour displacement between sectors.
Finally, we estimate that the NSR will slightly increase CO2 emissions. Although
the much shorter shipping distances will reduce the emissions associated with water
transportation, these gains are offset by a combination of higher trade volumes and
a shift to emission-intensive production in Northeast Asia.
37It is important to note that these particular CO2 results are relative to the baseline scenario
we chose, but different baselines would yield the same qualitative result as long as relative emission
patterns are similar.
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A Appendix
Table 7: Robustness check: measures of distance and dummies model only
B_T CRP ELE
shipping CEPII no shipping CEPII no shipping CEPII no
distance distance distance distance distance distance distance distance distance
𝑁 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863
pseudo 𝑅2 0.9831 0.9660 0.4902 0.9673 0.9545 0.6572 0.9483 0.9398 0.7698
BIC 1.2e+05 3.5e+05 6.7e+06 2.1e+06 2.9e+06 2.3e+07 1.5e+06 1.7e+06 7.0e+06
MTL MVH OGD
shipping CEPII no shipping CEPII no shipping CEPII no
distance distance distance distance distance distance distance distance distance
𝑁 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863
pseudo R2 0.9734 0.9536 0.6407 0.9564 0.9554 0.6735 0.9812 0.9633 0.5968
BIC 1.7e+06 3.0e+06 2.4e+07 1.6e+06 1.6e+06 1.3e+07 1.7e+06 3.5e+06 3.9e+07
OMC PRA PRE
shipping CEPII no shipping CEPII no shipping CEPII no
distance distance distance distance distance distance distance distance distance
𝑁 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863
pseudo R2 0.9675 0.9500 0.7274 0.9796 0.9700 0.5013 0.9262 0.9009 0.6320
BIC 2.4e+06 3.8e+06 2.1e+07 8.5e+05 1.3e+06 2.3e+07 2.1e+06 2.8e+06 1.1e+07
PRF P_C
shipping CEPII no shipping CEPII no shipping CEPII no
distance distance distance distance distance distance distance distance distance
𝑁 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863
pseudo R2 0.9829 0.9621 0.4559 0.9647 0.9389 0.5144
BIC 9.2e+05 2.2e+06 3.3e+07 9.4e+05 1.7e+06 1.4e+07
Notes: PPML estimates, all including source and destination fixed effects and variations on distance
controls. Significance levels: *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. Sector codes: B_T beverages
& tobacco; CRP chemicals, rubber, plastics; ELE electrical machinery; MTL metals; MVH motor
vehicles; OGD other goods; OMC other machinery; PRA primary agriculture; PRE primary
energy; PRF processed foods; P_C petrochemicals.
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Table 8: Sectoral description and aggregation
Sector Code Sector description Aggregated GTAP sectors
1 PRA Primary agriculture OSD (oil seeds), C_B (sugar cane), PFB (plant-based
fibers), OCR (crops nec), CTL (cattle), OAP (animal prods
nec), RMK (raw milk), WOL (wool), FSH (fishing), FRS
(forestry)
2 PRE Primary energy COA (coal), OIL (oil), GAS (gas), OMN (Minerals nec)
3 PRF Processed foods PDR (paddy rice), WHT (wheat), GRO (cereal grains nec),
V_F (vegetables & fruits), CMT (bovine meat prods), OMT
(Meat prods nec), VOL (vegetable oils), MIL (diary prod),
PCR (processed rice), SGR (sugar), OFD (food products
nec)
4 B_T Beverages and tobacco B_T (beverages & tobacco products)
5 P_C Petrochemicals P_C (Petroleum and coal products), GDT (gas manufacture
and distribution)
6 CRP Chemicals, rubber, plactics CRP (Chemical, rubber and plastic products)
7 MTL Metals I_S (ferrous metals), NFM (metals nec), FMP (metal prod-
ucts)
8 MVH Motor vehicles MVH (motor vehicles and parts)
9 ELE Electrical machinery ELE (electronic equipment)
10 OMC Other machinery OME (machinery and equipment nec)
11 OGD Other goods TEX (textiles), WAP (wearing apparel), LEA (leather prod-
ucts), LUM (wood products), PPP (paper products and
publishing), OTN (transport equipment nec), NMM (min-
eral products nec), OMF (manufactures nec)
12 TRA Transport OTP (transport nec), WTP (water transport), ATP (air
transport)
13 CNS Construction CNS (construction)
14 PSR Producer services ELY (electricity), WTR (water), TRD (trade), CMN (com-
munication), OFI (financial services nec), ISR (insurance),
OBS (Business services nec)
15 CSR Consumer services ROS (recreational and other services), DWE (dwellings)
16 OSG Public services OSG (Public Administration, Defense, Education, Health)
36
Table 9: Country sample
Code Country Code Country Code Country
1 aus Australia 38 aut Austria 75 bhr Bahrain
2 nzl New Zealand 39 bel Belgium 76 irn Iran
3 chn China 40 cyp Cyprus 77 isr Israel
4 jpn Japan 41 cze Czech Republic 78 kwt Kuwait
5 kor South Korea 42 dnk Denmark 79 omn Oman
6 mng Mongolia 43 est Estonia 80 qat Qatar
7 twn Taiwan 44 fin Finland 81 sau Saudi Arabia
8 idn Indonesia 45 fra France 82 tur Turkey
9 mys Malaysia 46 deu Germany 83 are United Arab Emirates
10 phl Philippines 47 grc Greece 84 egy Egypt
11 sgp Singapore 48 hun Hungary 85 mar Morocco
12 tha Thailand 49 irl Ireland 86 tun Tunisia
13 vnm Viet Nam 50 ita Italy 87 ben Benin
14 bgd Bangladesh 51 lva Latvia 88 bfa Burkina Faso
15 ind India 52 ltu Lithuania 89 cmr Cameroon
16 npl Nepal 53 lux Luxembourg 90 civ Cote d’Ivoire
17 pak Pakistan 54 mlt Malta 91 gha Ghana
18 lka Sri Lanka 55 nld Netherlands 92 gin Guinea
19 can Canada 56 pol Poland 93 nga Nigeria
20 usa United States 57 prt Portugal 94 sen Senegal
21 mex Mexico 58 svk Slovakia 95 tgo Togo
22 arg Argentina 59 svn Slovenia 96 eth Ethiopia
23 bol Bolivia 60 esp Spain 97 ken Kenya
24 bra Brazil 61 swe Sweden 98 mdg Madagascar
25 chl Chile 62 gbr United Kingdom 99 mwi Malawi
26 col Colombia 63 che Switzerland 100 mus Mauritius
27 ecu Ecuador 64 nor Norway 101 moz Mozambique
28 pry Paraguay 65 alb Albania 102 rwa Rwanda
29 per Peru 66 bgr Bulgaria 103 tza Tanzania
30 ury Uruguay 67 blr Belarus 104 uga Uganda
31 ven Venezuela 68 hrv Croatia 105 zmb Zambia
32 cri Costa Rica 69 rou Romania 106 zwe Zimbabwe
33 gtm Guatemala 70 rus Russian Federation 107 bwa Botswana
34 hnd Honduras 71 ukr Ukraine 108 nam Namibia
35 nic Nicaragua 72 arm Armenia 109 zaf South Africa
36 pan Panama 73 aze Azerbaijan 110 row Rest of the World
37 slv El Salvador 74 geo Georgia
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Table 10: Northeast Asia, changes in trade volumes for goods for selected countries,
percentage changes
China Japan South Korea
exports imports exports imports exports imports
Austria 13.29 14.93 16.65 23.30 11.40 16.54
Belgium 12.50 12.71 17.11 15.95 15.68 16.44
Bulgaria -1.82 0.75 -1.48 0.28 -1.41 0.10
Croatia -1.37 0.58 -1.36 -0.10 -0.81 -0.19
Czech Republic 8.25 17.19 17.03 26.17 11.05 21.61
Denmark 11.94 15.29 14.88 19.50 11.03 16.63
Estonia 10.83 16.69 12.09 23.97 12.82 19.86
Finland 11.86 12.63 15.92 23.08 11.76 17.11
France 1.47 4.38 10.38 10.09 4.50 8.08
Germany 10.94 12.12 15.70 16.37 8.50 15.78
Greece -1.13 0.37 -0.66 -0.17 -0.86 0.07
Hungary -2.17 0.59 -1.56 0.96 -1.42 0.56
Ireland 12.18 14.39 16.62 18.32 74.44 17.16
Italy -1.52 1.12 -1.28 0.18 -0.96 0.38
Latvia 11.42 20.67 12.75 30.56 12.21 22.84
Lithuania 11.21 12.12 15.80 24.28 14.06 17.38
Netherlands 11.09 16.06 17.82 24.96 15.48 18.65
Poland 11.15 14.70 14.17 22.41 10.16 18.21
Portugal -0.69 1.09 6.35 8.80 4.49 5.58
Romania -1.88 0.88 -1.58 0.26 -1.34 0.32
Slovakia 7.72 6.74 15.52 13.22 9.73 17.58
Slovenia -1.67 1.47 -1.22 0.53 -0.81 1.18
Spain -0.73 1.20 7.01 8.31 3.36 4.29
Sweden 13.93 14.72 15.60 22.79 11.54 17.49
United Kingdom 12.83 12.57 15.06 18.31 11.64 15.69
Norway 12.70 13.63 15.85 22.98 5.75 17.22
Turkey -1.40 0.37 -1.14 0.11 -0.83 0.03
United States -0.81 0.43 -0.67 0.03 -0.32 -0.11
Source: Own estimations using the GTAP database.
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Table 11: Changes in trade values by region for selected countries, percentage
changes
Austria Belgium Czech Republic France
exports imports trade exports imports trade exports imports trade exports imports trade
Total EU -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 -0.7 -0.5 -0.1 -0.9 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3
South EU 0.0 -0.6 -0.3 0.1 -0.8 -0.3 1.1 -1.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2
East EU -0.7 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.7 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.9 0.3 -0.2
NW EU -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 -0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -1.1 -0.7 -0.9 -0.2 -0.5
NE Asia 11.6 11.0 11.2 11.1 12.5 12.0 16.1 8.5 9.4 4.6 2.4 3.1
RoW 0.2 -0.9 -0.2 0.2 -1.1 -0.5 1.3 -1.7 -0.1 0.2 -0.5 -0.1
TOTAL 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1
Germany Greece Hungary Ireland
exports imports trade exports imports trade exports imports trade exports imports trade
Total EU -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.7 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3
South EU 0.0 -0.7 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
East EU -1.0 -0.6 -0.8 -0.5 0.3 0.0 -0.7 0.3 -0.3 -0.7 -0.2 -0.5
NW EU -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -1.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.2 -0.4
NE Asia 10.6 10.0 10.3 0.3 -0.9 -0.5 0.7 -1.9 -1.3 8.6 6.7 7.6
RoW 0.3 -1.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 -0.4 0.1 0.2 -0.8 -0.1
TOTAL 0.8 0.9 0.8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3
Italy Netherlands Poland Portugal
exports imports trade exports imports trade exports imports trade exports imports trade
Total EU -0.5 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 -0.4 0.1 -1.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2
South EU -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.7 -0.2 0.7 -1.6 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
East EU -0.9 0.5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1 -1.0 -0.5 -0.9 0.6 -0.1
NW EU -0.7 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 -0.5 -0.2 -1.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.1 -0.3
NE Asia 0.7 -1.3 -0.8 10.6 10.6 10.6 13.4 10.7 11.0 1.5 0.4 0.8
RoW 0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.2 -1.1 -0.4 0.7 -1.3 -0.4 0.2 -0.2 0.0
TOTAL -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Romania Spain Sweden United Kingdom
exports imports trade exports imports trade exports imports trade exports imports trade
Total EU -0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.1 -0.9 -0.5
South EU 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.7 -0.3 0.2 -0.7 -0.4
East EU -0.6 0.3 -0.1 -0.6 0.6 0.0 -1.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.5 -1.1 -0.9
NW EU -1.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.8 -0.6 -0.7 -0.2 -0.9 -0.6
NE Asia 0.6 -1.7 -1.3 1.7 0.1 0.6 11.6 11.7 11.6 8.1 11.3 10.4
RoW 0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.8 -0.2 0.4 -1.4 -0.6
TOTAL -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6
China Japan Korea USA
exports imports trade exports imports trade exports imports trade exports imports trade
Total EU 4.2 7.5 4.9 6.1 9.0 7.1 3.2 8.6 4.7 -0.9 0.4 -0.3
South EU -1.1 1.0 -0.6 1.5 1.6 1.5 0.2 0.8 0.5 -0.3 0.2 0.0
East EU 5.9 7.1 6.1 9.3 9.3 9.3 8.0 8.3 8.0 -1.6 1.1 -0.1
NW EU 9.1 8.7 9.0 11.8 10.6 11.3 8.0 10.6 9.3 -1.4 0.4 -0.4
NE Asia -0.4 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.2 -0.4 -0.1 0.3 -0.6 -0.3
RoW -0.6 0.4 -0.1 -0.4 0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Notes: South EU is: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain. East EU is: Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Northwestern EU is: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Northeast Asia is: China, Japan, South Korea,
Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Source: Own estimations using the GTAP database.
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Table 12: Sectoral changes in export sales to China for selected countries, percentage
changes
AUT BEL CZE FRA DEU HUN ITA NLD ESP SWE GBR JPN KOR
Sector:
1 PRA 11.5 10.8 10.2 3.3 11.5 0.3 0.3 10.8 0.6 15.1 11.1 0.4 0.6
2 PRE 10.9 5.7 6.2 4.0 8.6 0.2 0.2 7.6 0.7 8.0 6.9 -0.1 0.0
3 PRF 19.9 18.5 18.1 5.9 19.8 1.0 0.6 19.6 1.3 24.4 18.2 0.2 0.8
4 B_T -1.4 -0.2 0.1 -0.4 -1.2 0.2 0.2 -1.1 0.1 -1.8 -2.0 0.1 0.2
5 P_C 17.8 22.2 15.2 6.0 22.5 0.6 0.5 24.2 1.3 19.9 38.1 0.2 0.4
6 CRP 11.9 14.6 15.2 3.8 12.8 0.8 0.6 14.1 1.3 11.6 12.3 0.2 0.3
7 MTL 18.1 15.2 17.3 5.2 16.3 1.5 1.1 18.1 1.6 16.6 15.0 0.0 0.2
8 MVH 5.9 6.2 7.3 1.7 5.8 -0.2 -0.3 6.8 0.1 6.1 5.9 -0.6 -0.4
9 ELE 19.5 18.1 20.9 5.5 15.5 2.3 2.1 16.7 2.6 15.7 17.6 -0.2 0.5
10 OMC 18.9 20.6 22.8 6.1 18.8 2.8 2.3 20.6 2.9 19.4 19.8 -0.2 0.3
11 OGD 16.9 15.8 18.2 6.0 17.0 1.2 0.9 14.2 1.5 19.3 17.3 0.2 0.3
12 TSP 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.1
13 CNS 0.8 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.1 0.1 0.1
14 BUS 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.1
15 ROS 1.5 1.1 2.9 1.8 1.9 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.8 2.1 0.2 0.3
16 OSV 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.1
Simple average 9.6 9.4 9.9 3.2 9.5 1.0 0.8 9.8 1.1 9.9 10.3 0.0 0.2
Notes: The description of each sector is given in Table 8 and country codes are in Table 9.
Source: Own estimations using the GTAP database.
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Table 13: Sectoral changes in export sales to Germany for selected countries, per-
centage changes
AUT BEL CZE FRA HUN ITA NLD ESP SWE GBR CHN JPN KOR
Sector:
1 PRA -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.9 0.1 8.9 25.6 13.6
2 PRE 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 9.8 18.5 14.6
3 PRF 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 15.9 30.9 20.3
4 B_T 0.0 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -2.1 -2.1 -2.3
5 P_C -0.4 -0.2 0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 19.0 29.1 22.8
6 CRP -0.3 0.0 0.5 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.4 -0.2 0.3 11.0 15.5 11.3
7 MTL 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 15.8 20.4 17.5
8 MVH -4.5 -4.0 -1.7 -5.1 -5.2 -5.4 -4.4 -5.4 -4.3 -3.5 6.8 11.0 10.2
9 ELE -2.8 -2.5 -1.2 -3.1 -2.7 -3.3 -2.3 -3.4 -2.7 -2.1 5.0 12.6 7.2
10 OMC -1.3 -1.0 -0.8 -1.3 -1.0 -1.3 -1.1 -1.4 -1.3 -0.9 12.6 16.8 7.1
11 OGD 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 12.4 18.5 15.8
12 TSP 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.7 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
13 CNS 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
14 BUS -0.1 -0.5 1.3 0.2 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
15 ROS 0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 -1.5 -1.4 -1.3
16 OSV 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2
Simple average -0.5 -0.4 0.1 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.2 7.0 12.2 8.5
Notes: The description of each sector is given in Table 8 and country codes are in Table 9.
Source: Own estimations using the GTAP database.
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Table 14: CGE results on GDP, real income and welfare
GDP index Real Income
Welfare
(per capita
utility) %
changes
Welfare
(equivalent
variation in
US$ million)
Austria 0.19 0.09 0.20 1,062
Belgium 0.49 0.44 0.53 3,460
Bulgaria -0.04 -0.16 -0.05 -49
Croatia -0.02 -0.12 -0.03 -20
Czech Republic 0.38 0.10 0.34 1,182
Denmark 0.21 0.19 0.27 1,101
Estonia 0.46 0.26 0.42 157
Finland 0.14 0.09 0.17 587
France 0.05 -0.05 0.05 1,794
Germany 0.28 0.17 0.31 13,049
Greece -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -83
Hungary -0.10 -0.30 -0.14 -242
Ireland 0.25 0.19 0.30 900
Italy -0.02 -0.13 -0.03 -673
Latvia 0.41 0.22 0.40 186
Lithuania 0.28 0.06 0.24 163
Netherlands 0.18 0.07 0.21 2,153
Poland 0.28 0.00 0.24 1,985
Portugal 0.01 -0.11 0.00 -5
Romania -0.04 -0.19 -0.05 -152
Slovakia 0.48 0.15 0.39 591
Slovenia -0.06 -0.24 -0.10 -63
Spain 0.02 -0.08 0.01 189
Sweden 0.14 0.05 0.17 1,313
United Kingdom 0.24 0.05 0.23 7,489
Norway 0.17 0.14 0.23 1,547
Turkey -0.03 -0.14 -0.04 -686
China 0.14 0.24 0.16 38,519
Japan 0.11 0.20 0.13 8,142
Korea 0.24 0.32 0.26 4,881
United States 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -1,021
Total (World) 0.06 0.05 0.07 88,107
Source: Own estimations using the GTAP database.
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Table 15: CGE results for the labour market, real wages and total employment
changes for three skill levels, percentage changes
Changes in real wages Changes in total employment
fixed labour supply flexible labour supply flexible labour supply
low skill med skill high skill low skill med skill high skill low skill med skill high skill
Austria 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.04 0.03 0.04
Belgium 0.64 0.52 0.57 0.58 0.48 0.53 0.12 0.10 0.11
Bulgaria -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
Croatia -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Czech Republic 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.05 0.05 0.05
Denmark 0.35 0.25 0.26 0.33 0.24 0.26 0.07 0.05 0.05
Estonia 0.44 0.36 0.41 0.40 0.33 0.37 0.08 0.07 0.07
Finland 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.03
France 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01
Germany 0.33 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.26 0.27 0.06 0.05 0.05
Greece -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Hungary -0.21 -0.15 -0.16 -0.19 -0.14 -0.15 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
Ireland 0.31 0.23 0.29 0.30 0.23 0.28 0.06 0.05 0.06
Italy -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Latvia 0.29 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.06 0.06 0.06
Lithuania 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.05 0.04 0.04
Netherlands 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.05 0.04 0.05
Poland 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.03 0.03 0.03
Portugal -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Romania -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Slovakia 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.05 0.05 0.06
Slovenia -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Spain 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sweden 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.03
United Kingdom 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.04 0.04 0.04
Norway 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.03
Turkey -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
China 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.03
Japan 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.03
Korea 0.32 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.27 0.29 0.06 0.05 0.06
United States -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: By construction, total employment does not change in the fixed labour supply scenario.
Source: Own estimations using the GTAP database.
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Table 16: CGE results for the labour market, labour displacement and employment
changes for low skill workers in selected sectors, percentage changes
Labour displacement Sectoral employment changes
flexible labour supply low skill, flexible labour supply
low skill medium skill high skill Motor vehicles Metals Other manuf.
Austria 0.25 0.21 0.01 0.41 0.20 -0.11
Belgium 0.35 0.30 0.04 0.28 0.32 -0.64
Bulgaria 0.14 0.09 0.02 -0.08 -0.29 -0.17
Croatia 0.08 0.07 0.01 -0.19 -0.03 -0.12
Czech Republic 0.21 0.17 0.03 0.10 0.23 -0.27
Denmark 0.65 0.41 0.07 -0.15 -0.13 -1.10
Estonia 0.44 0.35 0.04 -0.20 0.24 -0.58
Finland 0.39 0.21 0.05 -0.04 0.21 -0.06
France 0.14 0.10 0.01 -0.15 -0.02 -0.19
Germany 0.35 0.25 0.03 0.54 0.29 -0.77
Greece 0.07 0.04 0.00 -0.14 -0.08 -0.10
Hungary 0.36 0.24 0.04 0.11 0.18 0.00
Ireland 0.33 0.22 0.17 -0.38 -0.43 -0.98
Italy 0.08 0.04 0.02 -0.14 0.01 -0.08
Latvia 0.74 0.44 0.05 0.00 0.26 -0.48
Lithuania 0.34 0.22 0.04 0.05 0.37 -0.38
Netherlands 0.51 0.34 0.08 0.05 0.62 -1.14
Poland 0.42 0.28 0.01 0.06 0.57 -0.37
Portugal 0.12 0.07 0.02 -0.08 0.05 -0.13
Romania 0.11 0.07 0.01 -0.07 0.10 -0.06
Slovakia 0.49 0.34 0.06 1.33 -0.04 -0.28
Slovenia 0.19 0.16 0.01 -0.11 0.10 -0.10
Spain 0.12 0.06 0.02 -0.21 -0.01 -0.10
Sweden 0.32 0.21 0.01 0.04 0.54 -0.41
United Kingdom 0.34 0.24 0.04 0.34 0.65 -0.93
Norway 0.50 0.27 0.02 -0.49 0.58 -0.81
Turkey 0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.13 0.03 -0.11
China 0.13 0.10 0.01 -0.53 -0.09 0.21
Japan 0.17 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.01 -0.08
Korea 0.21 0.17 0.01 -0.05 -0.21 -0.07
United States 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.02
Notes: Labour displacement is the weighted standard deviation of the sectoral changes.
Source: Own estimations using the GTAP database.
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Table 17: CGE results on CO2 emissions for selected countries
CO2
emission
changes
(MT)
CO2 emission
% changes
Benchmark
CO2 levels
(projections
in 2030)
share in 2030
projections
Austria 0.05 0.06 72 0.2%
Belgium 0.44 0.37 117 0.3%
Bulgaria -0.01 -0.02 67 0.2%
Croatia -0.01 -0.03 19 0.0%
Czech Republic 0.26 0.19 132 0.3%
Denmark 0.00 0.00 77 0.2%
Estonia 0.08 0.40 21 0.0%
Finland 0.01 0.01 60 0.1%
France 0.13 0.03 413 1.0%
Germany 0.93 0.14 685 1.6%
Greece -0.08 -0.04 207 0.5%
Hungary -0.03 -0.07 48 0.1%
Ireland 0.08 0.15 52 0.1%
Italy -0.17 -0.04 403 0.9%
Latvia 0.03 0.23 13 0.0%
Lithuania 0.01 0.11 14 0.0%
Netherlands 0.32 0.17 190 0.4%
Poland 0.49 0.14 359 0.8%
Portugal -0.02 -0.03 57 0.1%
Romania -0.03 -0.03 98 0.2%
Slovakia 0.10 0.27 37 0.1%
Slovenia -0.02 -0.09 18 0.0%
Spain -0.07 -0.02 303 0.7%
Sweden 0.06 0.10 56 0.1%
United Kingdom 1.01 0.19 522 1.2%
Norway 0.00 0.00 75 0.2%
Turkey -0.19 -0.04 441 1.0%
China 12.13 0.09 13,055 30.7%
Japan 0.68 0.07 1,039 2.4%
Korea 0.69 0.11 658 1.5%
United States -0.63 -0.01 6,052 14.2%
Total (World) 14.23 0.06 25,361 100.0%
Source: Own estimations using the GTAP database.
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